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Abstract
Background: Surgical procedures are now very common, with estimates ranging from 4% of the general
population having an operation per annum in economically-developing countries; this rising to 8% in
economically-developed countries. Whilst these surgical procedures typically result in considerable improvements
to health outcomes, it is increasingly appreciated that surgery is a high risk industry. Tools developed in the
aviation industry are beginning to be used to minimise the risk of errors in surgery. One such tool is the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) surgery checklist. The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) manages the largest
database of patient safety incidents (PSIs) in the world, already having received over three million reports of
episodes of care that could or did result in iatrogenic harm. The aim of this study was to estimate how many
incidents of wrong site surgery in orthopaedics that have been reported to the NPSA could have been prevented
by the WHO surgical checklist.
Methods: The National Reporting and Learning Service (NRLS) database was searched between 1
st January 2008-
31
st December 2008 to identify all incidents classified as wrong site surgery in orthopaedics. These incidents were
broken down into the different types of wrong site surgery. A Likert-scale from 1-5 was used to assess the
preventability of these cases if the checklist was used.
Results: 133/316 (42%) incidents satisfied the inclusion criteria. A large proportion of cases, 183/316 were
misclassified. Furthermore, there were fewer cases of actual harm [9% (12/133)] versus ‘near-misses’ [121/133 (91%)].
Subsequent analysis revealed a smaller proportion of ‘near-misses’ being prevented by the checklist than the
proportion of incidents that resulted in actual harm; 18/121 [14.9% (95% CI 8.5 - 21.2%)] versus 10/12 [83.3% (95%
CI 62.2 - 104.4%)] respectively. Summatively, the checklist could have been prevented 28/133 [21.1% (95%CI 14.1 -
28.0%)] patient safety incidents.
Discussion: Orthopaedic surgery is a high volume specialty with major technical complexity in terms of
equipment demands and staff training and familiarity. There is therefore an increased propensity for errors to
occur. Wrong-site surgery still occurs in this specialty and is a potentially devastating situation for both the patient
and surgeon. Despite the limitations of inclusion and reporting bias, our study highlights the need to match
technical precision with patient safety. Tools such as the WHO surgical checklist can help us to achieve this.
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’’In 1935, the U.S. Army Air Corps held a flight competi-
tion for airplane manufacturers vying to build its next-
generation long-range bomber. In early evaluations, the
Boeing plane had trounced other designs. The flight
“competition,” was regarded as a mere formality. With
the most technically gifted test pilot in the army on
board, the plane roared down the tarmac, lifted off
smoothly, and climbed sharply to three hundred feet.
Then it stalled, turned on one wing, and crashed in a
fiery explosion. Two of the five crew members died,
including the pilot. An investigation revealed that noth-
ing mechanical had gone wrong. The pilot had forgotten
to release the new locking mechanism on the elevator
and rudder controls. A few months later, army pilots
were convinced the plane could fly and invented some-
thing that would be used on the few planes that had
been purchased... A checklist, with step-by-step checks for
takeoff, flight, landing, and taxiing. With the checklist in
hand, the pilots went on to fly the model (B-17) a total
of 1.8 million miles through several conflicts without one
accident.’’ [1]
This episode has been heralded as the key milestone
in the birth of the checklist.
The delivery of healthcare is complex and hence
riddled with the potential for errors due to human fac-
tors, system failures and, more commonly, a combina-
tion of the two [2]. Fortunately, many of these errors do
not result in harm, but some do, often as a result of a
multiplicity of minor errors co-aligning and resulting in
a more serious event that results in patient harm [3].
The proliferation of epidemiological and qualitative
research into medical errors has contributed to improve-
ments in our understanding of the root causes of many
of these errors [4]. Clinical outcomes, morbidity and
mortality are the product of both technical and non-
technical skill. Indeed analysis of error and morbidity
suggest that technical failures account for only a small
proportion of these. Healthcare systems are now recog-
nized to be a series of complex interrelated Microsys-
tems [5] where clinicians, patients and patterns of
practice interact to determine the outcome [6]. It is
clear that substantial aspects of clinical practice are now
too complex for groups of healthcare professionals to
carry out reliably from memory alone. Surgery is one
such example where clinicians are faced with high levels
of uncertainty in their daily work, which may impact on
the quality and safety of care patients receive [7]. This
understanding means that it is important for profes-
sionals (and their respective bodies) to identify and
implement strategies that reduce the risk of iatrogenic
harm while at the same time ensuring that optimum
outcomes are most likely.
In the UK, most people will have surgery at some
point in their life. Approximately 4.2 million surgical
operations are carried out every year in England alone.
That equates to one operation for every 12 people per
year [8]. Surgery has been categorised as a very unsafe
undertaking with a rate of fatal adverse events (cata-
strophic events per exposure) of 1 per 10,000 surgical
procedures. In industrial countries, major complications
occur in 3-16% of inpatient surgical procedures and per-
manent disability or death rates are 0.4-0.8% [1]. In
trauma surgery, the rate of serious complications is sub-
stantially higher at an estimated 1 per 100 surgical expo-
sures. By contrast, in civil aviation, railway transport and
nuclear power the rate of death is less than 1 per mil-
lion exposures [9].
Whilst surgical training and practice has focused on
technical skills and technological advances there has
been little recognition of the benefits of non-technical
skills (human factors). Most of the errors that occur
during surgery can be attributed to failures in these
non-technical skills such as situation awareness, decision
making, communication and teamwork and leadership.
Other high-risk industries such as aviation and petro-
leum have made great progress in managing these chal-
lenges and have reduced harmful events by several
orders of magnitude. They have achieved this by accept-
ing that humans working in complex systems inevitably
make errors and have provided opportunities to learn
and improve performance. This insight has led to a
focus on building systems that reliably deliver what is
required and that identify errors that occur with built in
mitigation steps that prevent errors causing harm. Cen-
tral to the success of such initiatives has been an
increased appreciation of the role of human factors, the
value of teamwork and the principles of reliable system
design. Specifically they have built formal mechanisms
of communication, trained in non-technical skills and
developed checklists [10].
In January 2007, the World Health Organization
(WHO) began a programme aimed at improving the
safety of surgical care globally. This initiative - Safe Sur-
gery Saves Lives - identified minimum standards of sur-
gical care that can be universally applied across
countries and settings [1]. A core set of safety checks
was developed in the form of a WHO Surgical Safety
Checklist that can be used in any surgical setting and
operating theatre environment. Each step in the check-
list is simple, widely applicable, measurable, and has
been shown to be associated with a reduced risk of
death and major complications in a range of clinical set-
tings. The instrument suggests three phases: Sign-in,
Time-out and Sign-out. The “Sign-in” is done prior to
induction of anaesthesia and includes confirmation of
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as checks for allergies, assessment of difficult airways
and anticipated blood loss. “Time-out” occurs just prior
to skin incision and serves to confirm the patient, site,
procedure and position, the application of the surgical
site infection bundle, the use of venous thromboembo-
lism prophylaxis, the presence of the correct imaging,
equipment sterility and the anticipation of any critical
steps. Prior to the removal of the drapes, the “Sign-out”
confirms the procedure performed and the instrument
a n ds w a bc o u n t sa sw e l la sp l a n sf o rp o s t - o p e r a t i v e
management. These questions are a final check. They
are intended to be usually a redundant step in the pro-
cess identifying the few occasions when all other pro-
cesses have failed to ensure the patient receives
everything intended. This and the simple effect of know-
ing they are to be asked significantly improve the relia-
bility of the clinical processes and may reduce
complications by up to 50% [11].
The NPSA has instituted the NRLS database of patient
safety incidents (PSIs) [12]. Running since 2003, this
database is now the largest of its kind in the world,
already having received over four million reports of
events that caused or had the potential to cause harm
[13]. Incident reporting does not reveal the true inci-
dence or prevalence of errors, but the volume or reports
gathered can provide important insights into the fre-
quency and causes of errors, and offer opportunities to
identify possible ameliorative responses [14]. Reports
continue to accrue at an accelerating rate, with the data-
base currently receiving approximately a quarter of a
million reports per quarter. Data from 2008 reveal that
of these, 152,017 incidents (15.5%) related to surgery
and of these 32.4% (49,254 incidents) related to ortho-
paedics and trauma [15].
Wrong-site surgery represents a devastating event for
all parties concerned. Data from the National Health
Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) in 2006 reveal
that the cost of settling wrong-site surgery claims was
over £1 million pounds in England alone [16]. NHSLA
data also reveal that trauma and orthopaedics had the
highest number of claims with 29.8% of the total com-
pared with the next specialty, dentistry at 16.8% [17].
For example, an analysis of NHSLA data combined with
the NHS records for the total number of surgical proce-
dures carried out in the period 2006 to 2007 confirms
that orthopaedic surgery has the highest rates of wrong-
site surgery [18].
In the NRLS wrong site surgery is classified as any
event in which surgery is performed with the ‘wrong
patient’, ‘wrong site prosthesis’, ‘wrong side surgery’,
‘wrong side marked on patient’, ‘wrong side block’,
‘wrong side marked on theatre list’ and ‘wrong side
marked on consent form’.T h ea i mo ft h i ss t u d yw a st o
assess how many PSIs related to wrong site surgery
occurred in orthopaedics and of those how many could
have been prevented by the use of the WHO surgical
checklist.
Methods
We searched the NRLS database to identify incidents of
wrong site surgery across the specialty of orthopaedics
and trauma. These were incidents that occurred from
1
st January 2008- 31
st December 2008. These incidents
were reported with varying degrees of harm: ‘No harm’,
‘Low’, ‘Moderate’‘ Severe’ and ‘Death’ (The search strat-
egy is available on request from the corresponding
author).
To examine whether a checklist could have mitigated
the wrong site surgery events, two members of the
research team (BP - non-clinical and SSP - clinical)
independently reviewed all PSIs relating to wrong site
surgery over the stipulated time period above and elec-
tronically transcribed them to a standardized data col-
lection sheet, The incidents were classified as:
￿ Wrong side marked on consent form
￿ Wrong patient
￿ Wrong site prosthesis
￿ Wrong side marked on patient
￿ Wrong side block
￿ Wrong side surgery
￿ Wrong side marked on theatre list
These were stratified further according to incidents
resulting in actual harm and ‘near-misses.’ The likeli-
hood of the checklist in preventing the incident was
assessed using a five-point Likert scale: 1 = very unli-
kely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = unsure, 4 = likely and 5 = very
likely. Further attempts to reduce bias were ensured
through non-clinical and clinical judgement. Any dis-
agreements were resolved through mutual discussion.
Means and standard deviations were calculated for each
score given by the two reviewers and a suitable graphi-
cal representation was provided.
Results
There were 316 incidents classified as wrong site surgery
in orthopaedics and trauma and reported to the NRLS
in 2008. Detailed review of these incidents revealed that
wrong site surgery events occurred in 133/316 cases
[42.1% (95%CI 36.7-47.5%)]. There was good agreement
between the two reviewers both for selecting, classifying
and assessing preventability of cases (Kappa = 0.97).
The remaining 183 (57.9%) cases had been misclassified
and were hence excluded from further analysis. There
was no evidence of any wrong site surgery in these
excluded cases. These cases had information irrelevant
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Appendix 1.
Additional file 1 gives a sample of the different cate-
gories of wrong site surgery. The likelihood of the differ-
ent categories of wrong site surgical incidents being
prevented by using the checklist is shown in Figure 1.
Table 1 reveals a smaller proportion of ‘near-misses’
being prevented by the checklist than the proportion of
incidents that resulted in actual harm; 18/121 [14.9%
(95% CI 8.5 - 21.2%)] versus 10/12 [83.3% (95%CI 62.2 -
104.4%)] respectively. Summatively, the checklist could
have been prevented 28/133 [21.1% (95%CI 14.1 -
28.0%)] patient safety incidents.
Discussion
Wrong-site surgery is a potentially devastating situation
for both the patient and surgeon. It does however con-
tinue to be a concern particularly in orthopaedics,
despite major initiatives to address the issue, for exam-
ple the “operate through your initials” campaign by the
Canadian Orthopaedic Association [19], the “sign your
site” initiative by the AAOS [20], the “SMaX” initiative
[21] and the Royal College of Surgeons’ and NPSA gui-
dance [22]. By February 2010, all hospitals in the UK
should have implemented use of the checklist. However,
results of a survey indicate that more than 60% of units
were evaluating or auditing whether the checklist made
a difference. Only 29% of hospitals found had identified
a way to record the checklist was used and having an
impact [23]. A lack of robust evidence promoting the
use of the checklist, briefings and debriefings can no
longer be cited as a reason for slow adoption of this
initiative. Two new studies by deVries EN et al [24] and
Neily Jet al [25] reveal that significant reductions in sur-
gical mortality and morbidity can be made through use
of checklists.
The root causes of wrong-site surgery are multifactor-
ial. However, featuring prominently in some of the ana-
lyses include breakdown in communication between
surgical team members, absence of verification in the
operating theatre and of a verification checklist, incor-
rect marking or consent, preparation of the wrong side,
incorrect draping, patient answering to the wrong name
[26] and failure of a formal ‘time-out’ procedure [27]. In
an analysis of wrong -site surgery near misses and actual
occurrences, assessments in which near misses were
identified that did not progress on to actual wrong-site
occurrences were significantly more likely to report
compliance with activities such as patient identification,
preoperative reconciliation protocols, notation of surgi-
cal site on consent form, participation of the surgeon in
preoperative verification and participation of all surgical
team members in formal time-out procedures [28]. One
of the key elements to preventing wrong-site surgery is
to have multiple independent checks of critical informa-
tion [29]. As we have shown, the checklist is an extre-
mely effective tool at preventing both ‘near-misses’ and
‘actual harm’ in the following categories of wrong site
surgery: wrong side block, wrong side marked on
patient, wrong side prosthesis and wrong side surgery.
The checklist is of limited use in ensuring correct filling
in of consent forms and generation of theatre lists.
Further tools such as briefings and debriefings may help
in this area. The relatively high frequency of listing
errors has previously been highlighted by the NPSA. For
example, from 2003 to 2006 there were 855 incidents
reported to the NRLS relating to erroneous details being
included on operating lists [30].
Despite the fact that a large proportion of our inci-
dents (91%) resulted in no harm, they all represent a
major increase in the risk of an adverse event occurring
and reveal systems with significantly degraded risk resili-
ence. Degraded risk resilience represents a situation in
which many of the barriers protecting against error have
failed; there is an accident waiting to happen [31]. The
capacity to defend against the potential for minor mis-
haps having a cumulative effect and escalating into
more serious breakdowns is an essential characteristic of
a reliable process. It requires a focus on the adequacy of
the organisational defenses that remain in reserve and
provide ‘resilience’ to the risk of an event escalating into
a major untoward event [32,33]. It is important that our
systems catch errors before they escalate and also have
defensive capacity beyond this in case the events
develop further, i.e. ‘to survive the unforeseen’ [33]. The
Figure 1 The likelihood of the different categories of wrong
site surgery being prevented through use of the checklist.
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harm by a magnitude of ten, so even though only 15%
of near miss incidents could have been prevented by
using the checklist versus 83% of actual harm incidents,
these ‘near-misses’ are the result of some checks or resi-
liency in the system. According to the Swiss-cheese
model, these would be the result of certain defensive
layers being intact [34].
Our study has several limitations. Analysis and inter-
preting data from the NRLS poses several challenges,
largely due to the architecture of the NRLS. The
approaches used for analyses include stratified sampling
of frequently occurring incident type and free text data
mining of specific topics [35]. Our search strategy may
have omitted some cases of wrong site surgery. Analysis
is also compromised by the lack of detail in many of the
reports received and, by virtue of the fact that reports
are anonymised, the lack of opportunity to easily go
back to those making the reports or to case notes to
identify further information [36]. It would have been
useful for us to contact some of the authors of the
wrong site surgery PSIs to delineate further what actu-
ally occurred. The gross under-reporting to the database
has been cited as its Achilles heel [10]. This often limits
the NRLS to warning, communication and detection or
rare PSIs [37]. It also presents a fundamental epidemio-
logical bias; gaining accurate data of error rates is con-
founded (level III/IV evidence). Whilst this is a valid
criticism, it is clear that reporting is increasing as clini-
cians become more aware of its presence and further-
m o r ed e v e l o pc o n f i d e n c et h a tt h e r ew i l ln o tb ea n y
personal repercussions to making reports. Convincing
clinicians of the usefulness of the data they contribute
should in due course further increase the frequency and
quality of reporting. Yet, it is increasingly likely that
m a n d a t o r yr e p o r t i n go f f e r st h eo n l yv i a b l es o l u t i o nt o
accruing reflective data. Perhaps in due course, we can
assess the trends of wrong site surgery using the NRLS
provided all hospitals provide accurate reports of equal
quality. Although some progress has been made through
the development of measures of safety and quality such
as ‘Never Events’ trend-analysis of adverse events
remains methodologically flawed [38,39].
Orthopaedic surgery is a high volume specialty with
major technical complexity in terms of equipment
demands and staff training and familiarity. There is
therefore an increased propensity for errors to occur.
Training in orthopaedic surgery focuses on technical
skills. Whilst essential, this fails to recognise that sur-
geons cannot perform to the best of their technical abil-
ity unless in a well functioning team. Better teamwork
and communication in operating theatres improves out-
comes, reduces risk, improves staff well-being and men-
tal health, reduces staff turnover and reduces delays and
glitches in the surgical process. These are all improve-
ments that will directly benefit surgeons and training.
Teamwork is definable and measurable and can be
improved through formal structured communication,
such as checklists. Healthcare, and surgery in particular,
is a team-based service yet we have ignored the experi-
ence of other high-risk industries to our patients cost.
The WHO checklist and associated briefings and de-
briefings are a major step forward in our approach to
delivering the safe reliable care we would want for our
family and to all our patients. The current state of
knowledge in this field makes it professionally unaccep-
table to continue without using these simple yet effec-
tive tools to improve all aspects of peri-operative care.
Conclusions
Orthopaedic surgeons take pride in their craft and there
is utmost precision deployed in repairing insult to bone.
Perhaps it is time, that we applied the same precision to
mitigating against errors. The checklist is one such
weapon in the armamentarium of the orthopaedic
surgeon.
Table 1 Frequency of wrong site surgery incidents
Category of wrong site surgery Near-
misses, n
(% of
total)
Near-misses prevented by the
checklist, n (% of individual
category of wrong site surgery)
Actual
harm, n (%)
Actual harm prevented by the
checklist, n (% of individual
category of wrong site surgery)
wrong patient 1 (0.8) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
wrong side block 7 (5.8) 7 (100.0) 5 (41.7) 5 (100.0)
wrong side marked on consent form 50 (41.3) 4 (8.0) 2 (16.7) 0 (0.0)
wrong side marked on patient 9 (7.4)) 4 (44.4) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
wrong side prosthesis 2 (1.7) 2 (100.0) 3 (25.0) 3 (100.0)
wrong side surgery 1 (0.8) 1 (100.0) 2 (16.7) 2 (100.0)
wrong side marked on theatre list 51 (42.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Total 121
(100.0)
18 (14.9) 12 (100.0) 10 (100.0)
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Page 5 of 7Appendix 1 - some examples of misclassified
incidents
‘Pt admitted on 11/3/8. Not given any of her cardiac
medications for about 48 hrs because they were not on
the ward, including her beta - blocker . .’
‘Blister noted to right heel, 2 × 1 cm, pink skin, skin
intact, grade 2 sore. Left exposed and procedure three.
For gel heel pad. Waterlow score amended . .’
‘The patient was booked for surgery under the consul-
tant orthopaedic surgeon. It was scheduled on the list of
orthopaedic fellow on 25/3/08 and consultant anaesthe-
tist. Patient was scheduled as the last patient on the list
for left total knee replacement. Following spinal/epidural
anaesthesia it was noted that the only X-ray present was
for the right knees. Left knee × - rays could not be
located. Decision made to cancel surgery and arranged
X-ray of left knee for surgery at a later date . .’
‘Found expired Warfarin tablets whilst checking TTOs
for patient . .’
‘Pt list admission for right total hip. Pt presented to ward
with ulcer to left big toe, therefore theatre cancelled. Pt
states this ulcer developed approx 1 month ago but did
not contact pre - op assessment to inform them . .’
Additional material
Additional file 1: Examples of wrong site surgery.
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